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Computational Models of Human Decision-Making
With Application to the Internet of Everything
Setareh Maghsudi and Max Davy
Abstract—The concept of the Internet of Things
(IoT) first appeared a few decades ago. Today, by the
ubiquitous wireless connectivity, the boost of machine
learning and artificial intelligence, and the advances
in big data analytics, it is safe to say that IoT has
evolved to a new concept called the Internet of Ev-
erything (IoE) or the Internet of All. IoE has four
pillars: Things, human, data, and processes, which
render it as an inhomogeneous large-scale network.
A crucial challenge of such a network is to develop
management, analysis, and optimization policies that
besides utility-maximizer machines, also take irrational
humans into account. We discuss several networking
applications in which appropriate modeling of human
decision-making is vital. We then provide a brief review
of computational models of human decision-making.
Based on one such model, we develop a solution for
a task offloading problem in fog computing and we
analyze the implications of including humans in the
loop.
Keywords: Cognitive hierarchy, Decision-making, Hu-
man agent, IoE, Prospect theory, Social preference
I. Introduction
Integrating the human element in digital technology is
a crucial aspect of digitalization that blurs the boundaries
between the cyber and physical worlds. Many emerging
application domains of IoE, such as intelligent transporta-
tion systems and autonomous driving include humans in
addition to machines. An example of the potential of the
human-in-the-loop can be seen on the basis of the follow-
ing assumption: Given the great dissemination of smart-
phones as a result of their vast functionality and wide
price-range, near-future human-in-the-loop systems will be
heavily based on smart-phone technology. Consequently,
their powerful computation and sensing capabilities can be
utilized to address networking challenges such as scarcity
of resources.
While combining humans and machines to achieve sus-
tainable resource allocation and efficient service provi-
sion in networks is promising, the integration of humans
and machines in a unique network is challenging due to
the following reasons: (i) Humans make mistakes, often
due to inaccurate beliefs and imprecise predictions; (ii)
Humans often act irrationally and based on heuristics;
(iii) Humans think and act in different manners as a
result of their unique background, including personality
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and experiences. These characteristics stand in contrast to
the most common assumptions of rational decision-making
and strategic behavior. As a result, human behavior can-
not be formalized by using conventional models such as
simple concave utility functions, and new models need
to be developed. For example, the well-being of humans
is strongly based on their utility compared to that of
others, rather than the absolute magnitude of the utility
on its own. Another example is the herding phenomenon
observed in humans, which describes how individuals in
a group can act collectively without centralized direction.
A further example is the information-avoidance behavior,
where, by consciously ignoring the available information,
individuals perform some tasks that oppose their values
[1]. For the analysis, management, and optimization of
networks with both humans and machines, appropriate
modeling of this irrational human behavior is crucial.
Moreover, the presence of the human often harms the
reliability of the data based on which the network is con-
trolled. Often suppressed by norm-related conflicts, infor-
mation externalities, and emotions, self-reported human
data is severely biased. Therefore, learning or predicting
the human’s intent is highly complicated.
In Section II, we show that considering human-
introduced characteristics for network management by
using appropriate models is needed, and we review some
research papers that take the human into account when
addressing the optimization problem. In Section III, we
provide a brief survey on models for human behavior.
In Section IV, we describe some important issues in de-
veloping models. In Section V, we provide an exemplary
application of such modeling in edge computing. Section
VI concludes the paper.
II. State-of-the-Art and Applications
In this section, we first briefly review some relevant
literature. Afterward, we describe some applications of
agent-based modeling of human behavior.
A. State-of-the-Art
Human-in-the-loop systems can be discussed from sev-
eral perspectives. Article [2] is a forward-looking survey
on human-in-the-loop control in cyber-physical systems,
with an emphasis on robotics and human-machine inter-
action. A theoretical framework for shared control between
humans and autonomous agents is proposed in [3], which
is based on nonlinear optimization. Architectural issues
are also a concern in designing socially-intelligent systems.
For example, [4] is an attempt for including wireless
2sensor networks into the human-in-the-loop cyber-physical
system. In this work, the network is designed to support
user-driven applications, through peer-to-peer in-network
queries between resource-constrained devices. Another im-
portant topic, which is the focus of this paper, is to
formally model human behavior, which finds application
in a wide range of scenarios. In [5], the authors propose
an algorithm that maintains high levels of cooperation in
a peer-to-peer network consisting of entities that perform
the collective task of file sharing. The algorithm is adapted
from tag models of cooperation in social science, which
do not rely on explicit reciprocity, reputation or trust
mechanisms. Moreover, it does not require any central
controller. In [6], the authors present an optimization-
based method for approximating the stochastic reachable
sets, for informative prediction in human-in-the-loop sys-
tems. Reference [7] proposes a human-in-the-loop control
mechanism based on human data analysis, which results
in a reduction of energy-waste by detection of distractions.
In [8], the authors consider the repeated task manage-
ment problem. To include the human in the system, they
utilize a model based on prospect theory. Reference [9]
investigates the crowdsourcing of multimedia files, where
the cognitive hierarchy concept is applied to formalize the
decision-making of human agents in saving and sharing
files. Finally, in [10], the authors consider the cyber secu-
rity problem by formulating the attacker-defender interac-
tions as an evolutionary game. They model the behavior of
real-world players using quantal best-response dynamics.
In Table I, we summarize some of the research papers
that involve human agent and use specific computational
models for human decision-making.
B. Application
The decision-making of humans affects network plan-
ning in a variety of applications related to the IoE, espe-
cially those involving cooperation or competition. In the
following, we provide a few examples.
Fog Computing:
IoE necessitates energy-efficient and low-latency computa-
tion, which is impossible to achieve if the central cloud is
the sole option for computation offloading. To address this
challenge, fog computing employs smart devices located
at the proximity of users for intermediate computation
and storage of small- or medium-scale tasks, while the
computationally-expensive tasks are still forwarded to the
cloud. Given the rapidly increasing number of smart hand-
held devices, motivating users to participate in fog compu-
tation using their idle devices would result in a significant
reduction in deployment, transmission, and computation
cost. Moreover, it is possible to pursue users to select fog
nodes over the central cloud, or vice versa. Therefore, to
realize the full potential of fog computing, it is essential to
develop appropriate models for human decision-making.
Device-to-Device (D2D) Caching:
The mobile data traffic caused by on-demand multime-
dia transmission exhibits the asynchronous content reuse
property; that is, the users request a few popular files
at different times, but at relatively small time intervals.
Wireless caching takes advantage of this property: Instead
of being fetched from the core network frequently in
small time intervals, the popular files are stored and re-
transmitted whenever requested by new users. Among
different models of strategies for wireless caching, D2D
caching involves user devices to build a virtual library by
storing different files privately and provide each other with
the files on-demand. Therefore, similar to fog-computing,
it is essential to provide human users with incentives to
collect and distribute multi-media contents.
Opportunistic Cooperative Communications:
The basic idea of cooperative communications is that
multiple relays cooperate to help a source forward its mes-
sage to the destination, thereby enhancing the throughput
and extending the coverage. In such a scheme, the relays
are not pre-determined and pre-deployed. Instead, nearby
devices simply act as relays to forward the data. Naturally,
acting as relays necessitates an expenditure of the radio
resources such as spectrum and power. Therefore, unless
a user receives an attractive pay-off, it would not allow its
device to cooperate in transmission. Developing suitable
reimbursement schemes, however, requires modeling the
decision-making behavior of the human.
Wireless Energy Transfer:
Wireless energy transfer between devices is a promising
idea for the charging of wireless sensor networks, small
mobile equipment, on-body medical devices. As the en-
ergy waste during the wireless transfer grows with in-
creased distance, it pairs well with energy harvesting.
While each device obtains its required energy partially
thorough energy harvesting, the rest can be acquired from
the nearby devices that do not urgently need energy.
Because there is a high density of human-driven devices in
many geographical areas, they are considered as suitable
choices to participate ins such energy transfers. However,
reimbursement is required to justify such a transfer. To set
prices, the network manager and automated participants
need to model the decision-makers optimally to allocate
their budget efficiently and maximize their revenue or
minimize their costs.
The performance of every technological network (such as
a wireless network) depends on several, often conflicting,
variables. Therefore, given the system’s characteristics, the
network manager designs a specific optimization objective
function for each particular application. The optimization
sometimes involves model development as well (e.g., using
game theory). The model development strongly relies on
the problem under investigation while it is essential to
also consider the general performance metrics such as
complexity and stability. In this regard, human-in-the-
loop IoT applications are similar to their counterparts
that do not involve human intervention. The difference
often arises in formalizing the model taking humans’
irrational behavior into account. Some scenarios such as
fog computing, wireless energy transfer, and cooperative
routing, resemble a market to provide commodities and
services. Consequently, the agents require incentives such
3TABLE I: Some Research Works with Human-in-the-Loop
Reference Challenge Approach
[5] File sharing Modeling human based on tag models of cooperation
[6] Informative prediction of human action Optimization
[7] Energy efficiency Modeling human based on data analysis
[8] Repeated task allocation Modeling human utilizing prospect theory
[9] Multimedia crowdsourcing Modeling human by applying cognitive hierarchy
[10] Cyber security defense Modeling real-world players using quantal response dynamics
as monetary compensation. Therefore, to improve effi-
ciency, it is essential to acquire a good understanding
of the utility and the behavior of the involved human
decision-makers, for example, by suitably adapting the
utility functions; otherwise, appropriate mechanism design
is implausible. Some other scenarios such as D2D caching
or autonomous driving require coordination. In such cases,
it is crucial to predict the actions of human decision-
makers, utilizing appropriate models or possibly using
its features, similarity measures, and historical actions.
In summary, the unrealistic assumption that all decision-
makers are fully rational is a pitfall of traditional models
that shall be addressed.
III. Agent-Based Models of Human Behavior
Here we describe the most important models of human
behavior. These models aim to predict human behavior
in scenarios that can be modeled by a game-theoretic
framework. Contrary to typical machine learning methods,
they can operate with no historical data about human
behavior in games identical to the current game, so long
as they have access data about similar agents’ choices in
similar games. This data is used to estimate parameters
in behavioral models. The models aim at adapting the
classical game theory to capture real human behavior. To
achieve this goal, they combine the standard results with
insights from cognitive- and behavioral psychology and
microeconomics. These models seek to predict behavior in
one-shot, simultaneous games where participants do not
learn (whether due to one-off participation or since the
dynamics of the game change sufficiently fast to render
learning useless). Indeed, almost all of the theoretical
justification from behavioral psychology for these models
is based on the one-off interaction, as further interactions
may be complicated by the relationship between agents.
This means that if available strategies in a system are
not changing over time, then as data is accumulated from
observation of agents, a learning approach can be used
to improve or adjust the original general model of human
behavior. The usefulness of the models below, in such a
static system, would be then either to ’start-off’ such a
prediction model, or to use as a baseline for performance
evaluation.
A Brief Background in Game Theory
Normal-form games can be expressed as a matrix of pay-
offs for players, dependent on the combination of choices
made by each player, or, in other words, the joint action
profile. Each possible action for a player is referred to as
a pure strategy. A mixed strategy is then a probability
distribution over pure strategies. The expected utility of a
pure strategy for a player is the expectation of the payoff
of a particular action, given the belief of that player about
the opponents’ joint action profile.
In classical game theory, any rational agent seeks to
maximize its expected utility. Human agents, however,
often act irrationally due to emotions, social norms, peer
pressure, and the like. The experiments leading to the
development of human models for such games usually in-
volve showing such a normal form depiction to experiment
participants and asking them to make a choice. In this
paper, we describe computational models for bounded-
rational or irrational actors, who we assume in general are
selfish, but due to either emotions, biases or limitations on
human cognitive ability, are not optimal decision-makers.
Note that although mixed strategies play a crucial role in
classical game theory, they will not appear so often in these
models. The probability distributions over actions that
appear here indicate the varied levels of human cognition
that our models seek to capture rather than being a result
of players’ strategic thinking.
A. Iterative Strategic Thinking
The concept of Nash equilibrium is based on the as-
sumption that agents reason their way to an equilibrium
preemptively before taking any actions, via fixed-point
reasoning in which the agents find some equilibrium from
which a unilateral deviation does not improve the utility.
A natural alternative is to learn and develop towards such
an equilibrium, where the agents have the opportunity to
refine their strategy over time. In the absence of such an
opportunity for learning, we are left with iterative strategic
thinking, in which an agent reasons along the lines of ’she
thinks that I think that she thinks’ before making any
conclusion. A natural example is a financial marketplace,
in which participants price a stock by guessing at how
other participants will value it in the future.
1) Level-k Reasoning
Human agents participate in a limited number of iter-
ations of strategic reasoning. A level-k agent engages in
k iterations, responding to level-(k-1) agents by recur-
sively determining their behavior, and responding to it
by selecting the action maximizing their expected utility
[11]. The simplest model for the level-0 agents is uniform
randomization over available actions, and more complex
4specification is discussed below. The final model is a
linear combination of K agent levels parameterized by K
variables.
2) Cognitive Hierarchy
A subtle feature of the level-k model is that each agent
considers all of the other agents to be one level below
itself in the cognitive hierarchy. Alternatively, they can
respond to a linear combination of the strategies of lower
agents in the cognitive hierarchy model [11]. This can be
specified in several ways. Each level can have its own belief
about the proportion of lower-level agents (introducing
several parameters), or these distributions can be the
actual distribution of agent levels of the model, normalized
appropriately. For an agent at level-K, a popular way to
specify the distribution of agents is to assume that the
number of agents in each level k = 1, ...,K − 1 follows a
Poisson distribution.
3) Specifying Level-0 Behavior
The distribution of level types in the level-k or cognitive
hierarchy model significantly affects the proper specifica-
tion of level-0 behavior.
If there is no way to capture the errors made by
level-k players (see also Section III-B2), then the level-
0 specification captures such errors by a simple behavior
following uniform randomization as previously described.
Level-0 behavior can also capture the salient features of
a particular setting or commonly observed heuristics used
by strategically naive players. See [12], [13] for a summary
of how modifications to level-k and cognitive hierarchy
models improved models for games with asymmetric in-
formation, market entry and other coordination games,
games in which salient features affect coordination efforts,
and games of strategic communication.
B. Alternatives to Best-Response
In a perfect-rationality setting, best-response dynamics,
which return Nash equilibria if they exist, are unrealisti-
cally deterministic in their output. Part of the heterogene-
ity of human responses to situations can be explained by
their different cognitive abilities and methods of problem-
solving, as with the level-k and cognitive hierarchy models
above. Another part can be explained as people simply
making mistakes - even if they are attempting to act
strategically. The models below incorporate imprecision
into a noisy best-response.
1) ǫ-Nash
The simplest such noisy best-response function is to
return a pure Nash equilibrium (if any exists) with some
probability 1 − ǫ, and with probability ǫ, uniformly ran-
domize over the remaining actions [11]. However, this
approach has been shown to poorly model individuals’
behaviour, mirroring the observed fact that people make
systematically rather than randomly irrational decisions.
We use ǫ-Nash in the example in Section V to simply
demonstrate the effect of a small amount of noise on the
behaviour of agents. If we wanted to model agents’ be-
haviour accurately, then we would use more sophisticated
models, such as QBEs, described in the next section.
2) Quantal Best-Response
Quantal Best-Response (QBR) returns a probability
distribution over actions, satisfying two observations from
behavioral psychology: (i) An agent is more likely to
choose an action with greater expected value than an
action with less expected value; (ii) The likelihood of
making the optimal choice decreases as the importance
of the decision decreases, whether because the difference
between actions decreases, or because the payoffs decrease
in value [14]. The most common variation is the logit-QBR
function, which selects an action si with higher probability
if, under the belief Bi, it has a higher expected utility
Ui(si, Bi):
QBRi(si, Bi, λ) =
exp(λUi(si, Bi))∑
s′
i
∈Si
exp (λUi(s′i, Bi))
The precision parameter λ corresponds to the rationality
of agents. As λ → ∞, QBR approximates best-response,
and if λ→ 0, QBR approaches uniform randomization.
This can be used on its own, predicting the quantal
best-response equilibrium via similar fixed-point reasoning
to that involved in the calculation of Nash equilibria.
However, this reasoning is similarly (or more) difficult than
even Nash equilibria calculation. QBR can nonetheless be
incorporated into level-k and other models, replacement of
the previous utility maximization response. Incorporating
it usually improves predictive performance at the cost of
introducing only one more parameter-although variants
are possible, such as different precision levels for different
agent types [11].
3) Noisy Introspection
An alternative way to incorporate QBR is noisy intro-
spection, in which agents have no limit on the number
of strategic iterations they can perform, but their rea-
soning becomes noisier as they perform higher levels of
introspection, with a corresponding exponential increase
in the noise parameter [15].
C. Adjustments to utility function
The first group of models, iterative strategic thinking,
offer alternatives to the fixed-point reasoning used in
classical game theory. The second group of models intro-
duce systematic models of noisiness in decision-making.
The third group, described here, corresponds to changing
the underlying utility function, which produces the final
payoffs for agents, which their decisions are based upon.
1) Prospect Theory
A highly popular explanation for many non-rational
behaviors commonly exhibited by human decision-makers
is prospect theory. It is an alternative to conventional util-
ity maximization in decision theory, emphasizing people’s
biased perceptions of value and probability. As such, there
are two main areas of adjustments: how the agent perceives
5the values of outcomes (value function), and how the
agent perceives the probabilities of outcomes (weighting
function).
a) Value Function
In prospect theory, there are three key changes to way
outcomes are valued. Firstly, a possible outcome of an
action, rather than having a fixed ’utility’ value, is seen
as a ‘gain’ or ‘loss’ relative to their reference state, or
current state. Secondly, the base gain or loss of an outcome
is adjusted by a value function, following the notion of
‘diminishing returns’ and ‘diminishing losses’ with the
increase in value of the shift. Thirdly, the value function for
gains is scaled-down relative to that of losses, so an agent
will perceive the absolute value of a loss as larger than
that of a gain, reflecting people’s psychological aversion
to loss.
b) Weighting Function
Events’ probabilities are also transformed via a weight-
ing function. In the presence of uncertainty, each outcome
is associated with a relative probability of occurrence pi.
The weight function maps from the probability pi of an
outcome xi to a point in [0, 1], though its output is not
a probability measure. The weighting function reflects
people’s tendency to exaggerate the difference between
complete certainty and slight uncertainty. Among several
others, [16] provides possible parametric functional forms
for this relationship. The value of parameters can be
learned from the data. Caution is recommended where
learned parameters’ values lead to nonsensical weighting
functions, such as inverting the curvature.
Finally, we describe some limitations of the prospect
theory. Since prospect theory focuses on adjusting agents’
utility functions, we might consider combining it with
models of iterative decision-making, such as level-k. How-
ever, this would create tension between the assumptions
of iterative strategic thinking and that of prospect theory.
Namely, an agent in iterative strategic thinking mod-
els others using the same utility function which they
use, whereas Prospect Theory is based on psychological
research that suggests that agents are unaware of the
biases present in their own and others’ reasoning. There
is no obvious satisfactory resolution of this tension, and
exploring the applicability of prospect theory to game-
theoretic situations is an interesting direction for research.
2) Social Preference
A large class of models seek to explain non-rational be-
haviour via social preferences [17]. Such models formalize
notions such as aversion to inequity and reciprocity. The
formalization is then utilized to predict human behavior
in situations where conventional game theory incorrectly
predicts strongly selfish behavior. In these models, rather
than modelling agents as noisily deviating from best-
response, the utility functions of agents are given by a
linear combination of their normal or base ‘selfish’ utility
functions, and terms that incorporate notions of social
utility. By altering the weighting of the different com-
ponents of the utility function, either selfish behaviours,
or altruistic or other ‘non-rational’ behaviours, can be
emphasised.
There are then many possible behaviours which can
be modelled via using a utility function. One example
is altruism, in which the utility function increases with
global base utility. Another example is inequity aversion,
in which the utility function has a term which decreases
with inequity. Inequity can be measured in a number of
ways, one of which is simply to measure the difference
between the largest and smallest base utilities. Another
possibility is to compare the utility of each individual
with the average utility of the society. We can also model
‘negative’ behaviours. An example of this is envy, which
is modelled via a term in their utility function. This term
decreases with the difference between their base utility and
that of the highest-utility agent.
Notably, this does not require any complex iterative
procedures. A clear difference between this method and
the previous methods is that the ‘noisiness’ is not a
result of players making mistakes, but rather playing best-
responses according to notions such as what is fair or
unfair for themselves or society. As such, they model
significantly different aspects of agents’ behaviour. This
difference should be taken into account when modelling.
In Table II, we summarize the well-known models of
human behavior together with some of their application
areas in IoE.
IV. Developing a Model
As observed in Section III, most of the models that
formalize the human’s strategic behavior include some
parameters. Often, such parameters are optimally tuned
via training the model using the available data. Indeed,
one of the key features of a behavioral model is its data-
driven methodology: rather than normatively defining
mathematical features of games, it seeks to predict the
decision-making behavior based on past evidence of such
behavior. In the following, we provide a brief explanation
without going into details.
One conventional approach for training a model, i.e.,
to find the parameters’ value, is to use the maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE). The ‘likelihood’ describes the
plausibility of a set of parameter values of a statistical
model describing a set of observations, given those obser-
vations. In an MLE model, there is a likelihood function
associated with a statistical model. The function takes
in the vector of parameter values of that model and a
data set. The output is then the likelihood of the specified
parameter values given the data. More precisely, initially,
a model is created using the given vector of parameter
values. This model returns a probability distribution over
actions. Then, for every element in the training data, it
returns the probability of observing the selected action
and multiplies these probabilities together. The resulted
value is the likelihood that those parameter values describe
the observed data. The final parameter values for a given
6TABLE II: Well-known Models of Human Decision-Making with IoT Application Areas
Model Potential Application Area Brief Description
Iterative strategic thinking
Autonomous driving, E-commerce,
D2D caching
Making decisions based on some beliefs on how
others will decide, rather than the hypothetical
reasoning of game theory .
Alternation to best-response
Cooperative communications, Fog
computing, Smart grid
Making decisions to optimize an objective function
such as when bidding, but suffering from mistakes.
Adjustment to utility function
Sharing economy, Crowdsourcing,
Wireless energy transfer, Coopera-
tive mining
Incorporating factors beyond rational self-interest,
such as loss aversion (prospect theory) or a desire
for fairness (social preferences).
training set are those which maximize the likelihood func-
tion. The data required for such model training is usu-
ally collected by performing experiments; however, often
the usefulness of data from experiments as generalizable
training data is obscured by the experiment’s design to
answer specific questions about applications of behavioral
game theory to a particular area. Moreover, the quality of
data plays a critical role. For example, self-reported data
is frequently biased and inaccurate.
Finally, it is essential to evaluate the developed human
decision-making models. Here, the predictive ability of the
model is of specific importance. Therefore, such a model
should be tested on data separated from that it is trained
on, a concept which is known as cross validation. Other
important factors are low-complexity, interpretability, and
accuracy. Often, there is a trade-off between these factors.
For example, using the likelihood as a measure of accuracy,
despite being simple, lacks interpretability to some extent,
as it does not give much information about the importance
of different model parameters.
V. Example Application: Computation
Offloading in Fog Computing
Here we provide an example concerning fog computation
offloading to show the effect of humans’ irrational or
imprecise behavior on the system’s performance.
A. System Model and Problem Formulation
We consider a scenario with an offloading user that
divides some dividable tasks between a set of computing
fog nodes represented by m ∈ M = {1, 2, ...,M}. Each
fog node demands a price cm to perform each unit of the
task. We denote the share of each fog node m ∈ M by
rm ∈ R
+. The user has limited budget so that it should
satisfy
∑
m∈M
rmcm ≤ B, with B > 0 being the budget.
We cast the task allocation problem as a virtual ‘supply-
demand market’ by designing a two-level game to describe
the interactions among fog nodes and the offloading user.
On one side, the fog nodes represent the sellers that set
the service prices. On the other side, the offloading user
represents the consumer that uses the services by offload-
ing the task at the given prices. Therefore, the user(s) and
the fog nodes follow the iterative process summarized in
Alg. 1.
The performance of the offloading user depends on
several crucial factors, including (i) transmission delay and
Algorithm 1 Task Offloading to Fog Nodes
1: Each fog node m ∈ M announces the initial price cm;
2: repeat
3: The user determines the demand rm, m ∈ M;
4: Each fog node m ∈ M adapts the price cm.
5: until convergence
service delay; (ii) power consumption for data transmis-
sion; and (iii) paid service price to the fog nodes. We define
the utility function of the offloading user as
go(r1, ..., rM ) = a
∑
m∈M
αm log(rmβm)− cmrm. (1)
In (1), the first term is the utility of the user by offloading
the task. We model the utility by an increasing concave
function (e.g., logarithmic function) due to the following
reason: Although offloading is in general beneficial for
the user, the marginal utility of offloading decreases since
heavier offloading results in longer delays and higher en-
ergy consumption. The parameters αm and βm depend
on the characteristics of the fog node that affect the
user’s quality of experience, for example, the distance to
the offloading user, queue length, and the like. Detailed
description of such dependencies is out of the scope of this
paper. The second term in the right-hand-side of (1) is the
service cost paid to the fog nodesm ∈ M. The gain is then
the utility minus cost.
Similar to the offloading user, each fog node m ∈ M
has some measure for its gain. The utility of fog node m
equals the price paid by the offloading user. The cost is
then determined by several factors such as the consumed
energy. We model the cost of a fog node m by a linear
function with parameter c
(L)
m . Formally, the gain of a fog
node m ∈M yields
gm(cm) = κm(cmrm − c
(L)
m rm), (2)
where κm ∈ (0, 1] is a price-regulatory constant, which
is equal to one in the most conventional form. Naturally,
cm ≥ c
(L)
m . The traditional solution of the supply-demand
procedure described in Alg. 1 is the ‘Nash equilibrium’,
as determined in the following section.
B. Nash Solution
At Nash equilibrium, the players act by best-responding
to each other. Indeed, Nash equilibrium is the intersection
of the best-response dynamics of the players. Therefore,
7no player benefits by a unilateral deviation from the
equilibrium strategy, implying a steady state.
In the developed offloading game, the offloading user,
if fully rational, optimizes its performance by max-
imizing the utility function (1) subject to the con-
straint
∑
m∈M
cmrm = B. This problem is an equality-
constrained convex optimization problem with an one-
dimensional differentiable function for which ‘Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker’ (KKT) conditions hold. It requires only a
few calculus steps to show that r∗m =
B
cm(1+
∑
i∈M,i6=m
αj
αm
)
.
Similarly, every fully-rational fog node m ∈ M deter-
mines the service price by maximizing the utility function
given by (2) that corresponds to the best-response. As the
equilibrium is the intersection of the two best-response
dynamics, the optimal price is the solution of the following
r∗m + κm(cm − c
(L)
m )
∂r
∗
m
∂cm
= 0.
In the distributed implementation, the fog nodes start
from some minimum price and adapt the prices continu-
ously until convergence, i.e., until the price and demand
settle at some point. Based on an approach similar to the
one that appears in [18], one can establish that with the
given price and demand functions, the procedure described
in Alg. 1 indeed converges to an stable point that is the
Nash equilibrium of the formulated game.
For simulation, we consider a system with one offloading
user and four fog nodes. Fig. 1a depicts the iterative
interaction between the fog nodes and the user. It is
obvious that the price, and thus the demand, settle at
some point. The characteristics of this settlement point
mainly depend on the preferences of the user. These, in
turn, are determined by the properties of the fog node,
including their requested service price.
C. The Effect of Human Agent with Noisy Best-Response
In fog computing, similar to other crowd sourcing
schemes, the set of contributors might include small hand-
held devices, where the human agents take the role of
decision-makers. To model the human agents in the afore-
mentioned fog computing scenario, we use a noisy best-
response model. We model the imprecision of decision-
making by a uniform noise that is added to the best-
response as perturbation. We perform the experiment by
two small noise levels, namely maximum of 5% and 10% of
the best-response for all fog nodes and the offloading user.
Fig. 1b and Fig. 1c depict the results respectively. From
the figures, it is obvious that even a small deviation from
the fully-rational response can result in dramatic instabil-
ity in the system, as well as prolonging the convergence
time; As such, it should be taken into account for network
optimization.
D. Potential Solution to Resolve the Instability
To resolve the instability of the system that is induced
by the noisy best-response, we use a simple, yet effective,
signal processing approach, namely, signal averaging. Uti-
lizing this method relies on the assumption that every
player is aware of the possibility of making mistakes;
therefore, at every round, each player simply acts by the
moving average of its best-responses in all the pricing-
demand rounds so far. As it is evident from Fig. 1d, this
simple method reduces the noise significantly and resolves
the instability to a large extent.
Finally, Fig. 2 shows the utility of the offloading user
(as the customer) and the aggregated utility of the fog
nodes (as the suppliers) in different scenarios. It can be
concluded that in addition to system stability, imprecise-
ness reduces the system efficiency.
VI. Outlook and Conclusion
Humans play a vital role in future IoT networks. As
such, appropriate modeling of human behavior is signifi-
cantly important for network optimization. We elaborated
on formalizing human behavior using simple and efficient,
yet effective, models. Based on a toy example in the
fog computing framework, we showed that neglecting the
human-specific characteristics endangers the system’s sta-
bility. Therefore, in future-looking applications, the mod-
els of wireless communication networks based on multi-
agent systems with full-rationality shall be reconsidered
to include the imperfections in human behavior.
The complexity of humans’ character and behavior,
however, render such enhancement notoriously difficult.
While such difficulties have been studied in several do-
mains such as marketing, the available solutions are not
directly generalizable to technological networks such as
IoT, and further study is imperative. Some challenges are
as follows:
• Generally, one uses the available data to tune the
parameters of the computational models; however,
IoT applications are widely diverse. Moreover, gath-
ering a large amount of data might not be plausible.
As such, it is necessary to develop some methods
to manually adapt and re-use the existing data for
different scenarios, or to create synthetic data.
• It is important to adapt the standard human decision-
making models to the IoT applications, as such appli-
cations are influenced by various physical constraints,
e.g., the transmission medium over which the entities
communicate with each other.
• Centralized learning can be excessively time- and
energy-consuming; hence it is essential to develop
distributed learning algorithms to obtain accurate
models and parameters efficiently and securely.
• Another challenge is the implementation of human-
in-the-loop solutions in existing IoT systems. Indeed,
the efficiency and feasibility of such implementation is
itself a line of research, as it might require large com-
puting capability and availability of power resources.
• Investigating the effect of integrating humans in the
networks on addressing the trade-offs in IoT ap-
plications, as well as on network optimization and
management.
Beyond IoE applications and in the general setting, there
are several challenges open to address. These include
• As previously discussed, there are several models
to computationally formalize human decision-makers.
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(a) Fully rational agents.
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(b) Bounded-rational agents with 5% noisy best-response.
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(c) Bounded-rational agents with 10% noisy best-response.
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(d) Approximate resolution of instability.
Fig. 1: Price-demand negotiation. The x-axis shows the iteration rounds. Prices are normalized by 10. The resolution
of instability results from signal averaging over 10% noisy best-response.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop accurate and
application-specific indicators for the complexity and
permissiveness or usefulness of probabilistic models.
• Experiment design is a classical research direction in
behavioral studies. In this regard, it is important to
design diverse tests that reflect the usability of the
combination of two or more models.
• Although an entity might change its behavior over
time, such dynamics are largely neglected in the
current research. Therefore, it is imperative to study
models that include the time-variations in the behav-
ior of a human agent.
• Irrespective of the nature of players, efficiency and
stability are the most important factors in au-
tonomous systems. Therefore, developing methods to
eliminate the adverse effect of human agents on the
system’s stability is a significant line of research.
• Tailoring deep learning frameworks for an accurate
estimation of the models’ parameters is another po-
tential research direction.
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